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Article 5

The Creeping Federalization of
Wealth-Transfer Law
Lawrence W. Waggoner*
This Article surveys areas of federalization of wealth-transfer law.
Federal authorities have little experience in making law that governs wealth

transfers, because that function is traditionally within the province of state
law. Although state wealth-transfer law has undergone significant
modernization over the last few decades, all three branches of the federal
government-legislative,judicial, and executive have increasinglygone their
own way. Lack of experience and, in many cases, lack of knowledge on the part
of federal authorities have not dissuaded them from undermining wellconsidered state law.
The Article covers these topics: federal preemption of several areas of
state law, the development of federal common law as a sometime substitute for
preempted state law, the federal tax exemption for perpetual trusts, and the
right of posthumously conceived children of assisted reproduction to Social
Security survivor benefits.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal law' increasingly departs from state law when
governing wealth transfers. 2 The Uniform Law Commission ("ULC")
has taken notice of the phenomenon by issuing a position paper on the
development. 3 The ULC urges Congress and federal agencies to take

1.
By federal law, I mean acts of Congress, decisions of federal courts, especially the
Supreme Court, and regulations issued by federal agencies.
2.
Throughout the text, I use the term "wealth-transfer law" to mean the law that governs
donative transfers by wills, intestacy, and will substitutes. A will substitute, also called a
nonprobate transfer, is an arrangement respecting property or contract rights that is established
during the donor's lifetime, under which "(1) the right to possession or enjoyment of the property
or to a contractual payment shifts outside of probate to the donee at the donor's death; and (2)
substantial lifetime rights of dominion, control, possession, or enjoyment are retained by the
donor." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
[hereinafter PROPERTY RESTATEMENT].

§

7.1 (2003)

Will substitutes include revocable trusts, life insurance, pension and employee benefit
accounts, joint tenancy and other forms of undivided ownership with right of survivorship,
multiple-party accounts, payable-on-death arrangements, annuities with a death benefit, Totten
trusts, and similar arrangements. See id.
3.
See UNIF. LAW COMM'N, Principles of Federalism 1 (2013) [hereinafter UNIF. LAW
COMM'N, Principles of Federalism], available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
federalism%20and%20state%201aw/2013augFederalism%/ 20Principles.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/B7PY-NG7U. The ULC has not yet decided how to transmit the statement to federal
authorities. E-mail from John Sebert, ULC Exec. Dir., to Lawrence Waggoner, Prof. of Law,
Univ. of Mich. (Oct. 22, 2013) (on file with author). At the November 14, 2013, meeting of the
ULC Federalism and State Law Committee, the ULC decided that the next step is to work with
other organizations with similar interests. See UNIF. LAW COMM'N, Minutes of the
November 14, 2013 Meeting 2-3,
6
(2013),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Does/
Federalism%20and%20State%20Law/Federalismo20ando20Stateo20LawMinutesNovl3.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/7QEN-Q3AB.
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the following actions (among others) when considering laws and
regulations that potentially conflict with state law4 :
* "Carefully evaluate the way in which state law addresses the
issue under consideration."
* "Determine the extent to which states face differing needs,
circumstances, and requirements in responding to the issue
under consideration."
* "Exercise restraint when legislating in areas in which the states
have historically played a primary role . . . by taking action

which preempts state law only when necessary to achieve
objectives that cannot be reasonably achieved through
alternative policies."
* "When preempting state law other than to prevent direct and
irreconcilable conflict with federal law, specify as expressly as
possible the extent to which state law is superseded or
preserved."
Among the ULC's list of factors that favor states retaining
autonomy is that "[s]tate law historically has primarily occupied the
field."5 Historically, state law has occupied the field of wealth-transfer
law. Yet, as we shall see, federal law sometimes disrespects state law
that has been promulgated only after having undergone the
thoughtful deliberative processes of the ULC and then having been
enacted by a state legislature, typically after extensive review and
support by the relevant section of the state bar.
Although my purpose is to collect in one place various areas in
which federal law, not state law, governs wealth transfers, I make no
claim that the list is comprehensive. 6 Because this is a survey article,
each topic merits deeper investigation than I present here.
Parts II through V discuss federal law that preempts state law
concerning the validity of beneficiary designations under federally
authorized or regulated nonprobate transfers, i.e., state law
concerning divorce revocation, elective share, mental incapacity,

4.

UNIF. LAW COMM'N, Principlesof Federalism,supranote 3, at 2.

5.
Id. at 4; see also ROBERT A STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT UNION: A HISTORY OF
THE UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION 233-36 (2013).

6.
For example, except for infra note 26, 1 have left the slayer rule out of my discussion, as
that topic is covered in Professor Langbein's contribution to this Symposium. See John H.
Langbein, Destructive Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in Beneficiary
DesignationCases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1688-94 (2014). I
have also left out state rules regarding antilapse and simultaneous death, as those topics are
covered in T.P. Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 189-90 (2004).
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undue influence, and defective execution. These Parts also discuss the
application of federal common law as a possible substitute for
preempted state law.
Parts VI, VII, and VIII explore discrete topics. Part VI takes up
federally authorized military wills, whose execution overrides state
will-execution law. Part VII points to Congress' enactment of a tax
statute that unwittingly promoted perpetual trusts, which led states
to repeal or modify their perpetuity laws to allow such trusts. Part
VIII addresses the rights of posthumously conceived children of
assisted reproduction to Social Security survivor benefits. In this one
case, Congress has embraced, not preempted, state law. Years ago,
Congress incorporated the deceased wage earner's state intestacy
rules as its standard for awarding benefits. Because posthumous
conception is such a new phenomenon, however, many states have not
yet addressed intestacy rights for such children, and the states that
have done so have adopted diverse rules. The result is that the
children of some but not all wage earners will benefit.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE DIVORCE-REVOCATION LAWS 7
Revocation of a will on the basis of changed circumstances has
an esteemed pedigree in the law. At common law, the premarital will
of a woman was revoked upon marriage, and the premarital will of a
man was revoked upon marriage and birth of issue.8 In the twentieth
century, that common-law principle was replaced by revocation-ondivorce statutes. The 1969 Uniform Probate Code ("1969 UPC")
provided that any provision in a will in favor of a former spouse was
presumptively revoked upon divorce.9
When the 1969 UPC was revised in 1990, the nonprobate
revolution was in full flower. Much if not most wealth today passes on
death outside of probate through will-substitute arrangements, such
as revocable trusts, joint ownership by right of survivorship, and life
insurance and pension arrangements. The 1990 UPC revisions took
the logical step of extending the revocation-on-divorce provision of the
1969 UPC to nonprobate transfers.10 The UPC now provides that
divorce or annulment of a marriage presumptively revokes "any
revocable disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced
7.
My treatment of the divorce-revocation topic is quite brief. Professor Langbein covers
the topic in greater depth in another paper in this Symposium issue. See Langbein, supra note 6,
at 1668-71.
8.
See THOMAS JARMAN & J.C. PERKINS, A TREATISE ON WILLS 151-52 (2d Am. ed. 1849).
9.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 (amended 2010).
10. Id. § 2-804.
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individual to his [or her] former spouse."" About thirty percent of the
states-mainly states that have adopted the UPC reforms-have now
extended their divorce-revocation law to nonprobate transfers.12 The
Restatement of Property, promulgated by the American Law Institute
("ALI"), extends, as a common-law rule, the divorce-revocation rule to
nonprobate transfers. 13
Federal law authorizes or regulates a variety of nonprobate
transfers. Anticipating the possibility that federal law might be found
to preempt the divorce-revocation rule, the UPC provides that the
former spouse who receives benefits must pay them to the person who
would have been entitled to them were the revocation rule not
preempted. 14The UPC's post-distribution rule is essentially a codified
form of the age-old constructive-trust remedy used in equity to
prevent unjust enrichment. 15
As a result of a pair of decisions of the Supreme Court, Egelhoff
v. Egelhoff1 6 and Hillman v. Maretta,1 7 both the divorce-revocation
11. Id. § 2-804(b). The UPC divorce-revocation provision is a default rule, meaning that it
yields to a contrary intention. The divorce-revocation rule applies "[e]xcept as provided by the
express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of
the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage . . . . Id.;
accord PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 4.1 cmts. o-p.
12. Divorce-revocation statutes extend to nonprobate transfers in Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.804 (2013);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2804 (2014); CAL. PROB. CODE § 5600 (West 2014); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-804 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 190B, § 2-804 (2014); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 700.2806 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-804 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-814 (2013);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-804 (2014); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4 (McKinney 2014);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-04 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-804 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-804 (LexisNexis 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 20.111.1 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010
(2014). Professors Sterk and Leslie point out that in the states whose divorce-revocation statutes
are limited to wills, "a provision in the divorce decree that voids the designation [in favor of the
former spouse] may be given effect." Stewart E. Sterk & Melanie B. Leslie, Accidental
Inheritance:Retirement Accounts and the Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 196
(2014); see, e.g., Sweebe v. Sweebe, 712 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Mich. 2006) ("[P]laintiff signed a
provision in her judgment of divorce in which she extinguished any interest she had or may have
had in any insurance contract or policy of the decedent."); Reed v. Reed, 693 N.W.2d 825, 834
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005) ("[I]t is now well established that prenuptial agreements governing the
division of property in the event of a divorce are recognized in Michigan.").
13.
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 4.1 cmt. p.
14. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) (amended 2010).
15. See Sarabeth A. Rayho, Note, Divorcees Turn About in Their Graves as Ex-Spouses
Cash In: Codified Constructive Trusts Ensure an Equitable Result Regarding ERISA-Governed
Employee Benefit Plans, 106 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377 (2007). A constructive trust arises when "a
defendant is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title to identifiable property at the expense of
the claimant or in violation of the claimant's rights." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1) (2011).
16. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013).
17.
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rule and the post-distribution rule are preempted with respect to any
federally authorized or regulated nonprobate transfer.18 In Hillman,
Justice Sotomayor, speaking for the Court, held that the federal
statute in question, the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act
of 1954 ("FEGLIA") 19-and, in effect, any federal statute that provides
that pension, insurance, or any other proceeds are to be paid to the
named beneficiary-means that the proceeds "belong to the named
beneficiary and no other."2 0 The Virginia statute's post-distribution
rule-which is similar to the UPC's post-distribution rule-is
preempted: It "interferes with Congress' scheme, 21 because it directs
that the proceeds actually belong to someone other than the named
beneficiary by creating a cause of action for their recovery by a third
party." 2 2 Had these state laws not been preempted, federally
18. The Washington divorce-revocation rule that was preempted in Egelhoff is similar to
the UPC's divorce-revocation rule. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010(2)(a) (2014), with
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1)(A) (amended 2010). The Virginia post-distribution rule that
was preempted in Hillman is similar to the UPC's post-distribution rule. Compare VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-111.1(D) (2014), with UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(i)(2) (amended 2010).
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (2012).
20. Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1952 (quoting Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 55 (1981)).
State insurance codes have similar provisions. For example, the insurance codes of Michigan and
Minnesota provide that the proceeds of a life insurance policy are payable to the named
beneficiary. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2207 (2014) (life insurance proceeds "shall be payable
to the person or persons for whose benefit the insurance was procured"); MINN. STAT. § 61A.12
(2014) ("[T]he beneficiary shall be entitled to the proceeds . . . ."). Both states also have divorcerevocation statutes similar to the Virginia statute in Hillman. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2807
(2014); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-804 (2014). No state court in either state has ever as much as hinted
that its insurance code trumps the divorce-revocation statute on the dubious ground that the
proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.
21.
The Court's emphasis on "Congress' scheme" is part of the Court's move from deciding
preemption questions on the basis of the literal text of a federal statute (called "textualism") to
examining whether the state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the objectives of the
federal statute (called "obstacle preemption"). See Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism,
112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 n.38 (2013) ("[T]he Court's recent decision in Hillman rested squarely on
obstacle preemption . . . ."). Obstacle preemption was first adopted by a unanimous Court in
1995. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 656 (1995) ("We simply must go beyond the unhelpful text ... and look instead to the
objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive."). Obstacle preemption is questioned by some current justices, notably Justice
Thomas, who prefers to decide preemption questions on the basis of textualism. See Meltzer,
supra, at 35-43.
In the earlier Egelhoff case, the Court relied on ERISA's broad preemption clause,
which provides that state laws are superseded "insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any [ERISA-covered] employee benefit plan." ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). For
discussion of the Court's analysis in Egelhoff see Langbein, supra note 6, at 1671-78.
22. Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1952 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court did not base
preemption on administrative convenience because the rule "takes effect only after benefits have
been paid, and so would not necessarily impact the Government's distribution of insurance
proceeds." Id. at 1950. The Court based preemption on the dubious "belong to no other"
interpretation of the federal statute. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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authorized or regulated nonprobate transfers would only be affected in
those states whose divorce-revocation law reaches nonprobate
transfers that are not federally authorized or regulated. 23
Is there any chance that the gap in federal law will be filled by
a federal common-law divorce-revocation or post-distribution rule? In
an often-quoted pre-Egelhoff case, the Fourth Circuit provided this
guidance: Federal courts "should apply common-law doctrines best
suited to furthering the goals of ERISA [and presumably the goals of
FEGLIA and of any other federal statute at issue]."24 The Supreme
Court has decided that the goal of FEGLIA, and by extension ERISA,
is that the insurance proceeds must go to the designated beneficiary
"and no other." The strength of the Court's opinion in Hillman makes
it unrealistic to think that the Court would allow federal common law
to change that result. Although Justice Breyer, dissenting in Egelhoff,
could find no rationale for preempting the Washington divorcerevocation statute, 25 he was silent regarding the Virginia divorce-postdistribution statute in Hillman. Neither he nor any other Justice
dissented in Hillman.26

23.
For a list of those states, see supra note 12.
24. Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1453 (4th Cir. 1992).
25.
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 154 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("No one could
claim that ERISA pre-empts the entire field of state law governing inheritance[]...." (emphasis
omitted)).
26. The preemption of the divorce-revocation law invites comparison with the slayer rule.
Both rules are in the "probably would have revoked" category, but the post-Egelhoff slayer
decisions of the lower federal courts prevent the validly designated beneficiary-the slayer-from
taking or keeping the property. See, e.g., In re Estate of Burklund, No. 11-5024, 2013 WL 327622,
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2013); Honeywell Say. & Ownership Plan v. Jicha, No. 08-4265 (DRD),
2010 WL 276237, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2010); Atwater v. Nortel Networks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d
610, 614-15 (M.D.N.C. 2005). See also the pre-Egelhoff slayer decision in Addison v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 392, 393-95 (W.D. Va. 1998). These cases apply the applicable state's
slayer statute or federal common law based on the state slayer statute.
The slayer cases are different from the divorce cases in that the murdered victim did not
have an opportunity to revoke the beneficiary designation, whereas the divorced spouse did. This
is why the divorce-revocation rule is in the form of a rebuttable presumption but the slayer rule
is not rebuttable. The slayer rule is also based on the principle that a slayer cannot be allowed to
profit from his or her own wrong, whereas divorce is not a wrong. Finally, the slayer rule is
universally applied to nonprobate transfers. In jurisdictions in which the slayer statute applies
only to probate transfers, courts supplement the statute with the common-law slayer rule to
cover nonprobate transfers. See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 8.4 cmt. i ("If a
statute covers some but not all of the situations in which a killer stands to benefit from the
wrong as provided in this section, the slayer rule as enunciated in this section applies to the
situations not covered by the statute."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 cmt. b (2011) ("If a case is not covered by a particular statute, it must
not be supposed that the enrichment of the slayer is therefore to be allowed."); Jeffrey G.
Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 803, 847 (1993) ("[I]n
jurisdictions where the slayer statute refer[s] only to inheritance by will or intestacy, courts
nonetheless appl[y] a common law slayer rule [to nonprobate transfers].").
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By adopting the dubious "belong to no other" interpretation of
federal law, 2 7 the Supreme Court has destroyed the UPC's intenteffecting divorce-revocation rule for federally authorized or regulated
nonprobate payments. 28 Sadly, the Court seemed unaware of the
decades-long movement toward unifying the law of probate and
nonprobate transfers, of which the divorce-revocation and postdistribution rules are parts. 29 If the Justices were aware of that
movement, they were decidedly unmoved by it.
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE ELECTIVE-SHARE LAWS
Anglo-American law has traditionally protected the decedent's
surviving spouse from disinheritance. In early law, protection took the
form of dower and curtesy. Protection now takes the form of a
statutory elective share. The elective share is ineffective if it only
27.
The Supreme Court in Hillman said that the case was "govern[ed]" by two prior
decisions: Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981) (five-to-three decision), and Wissner v.
Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (five-to-three decision). Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1950-51 (2013). The
dissenting opinions in both cases were well reasoned. Justices Minton, Frankfurter, and Jackson
dissented in Wissner, saying that "the right which Congress gave the serviceman to designate his
beneficiary does not require disrespect of settled family law and the incidents of family
relationship." Wissner, 338 U.S. at 663 (Minton, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, dissenting in
Ridgway, said that "[c]laims based on family obligation ... may be precisely the type of claim for
which the federal benefit was intended." Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented on similar grounds. Id. at 60-62 (Powell,
J, dissenting). The dissenters in both cases argued that the only purpose of Congress in stating
that the insured had the right to name the beneficiary was to protect the interest of the
beneficiary from the claims of creditors. See id. at 62, 64-67; Wissner, 338 U.S. at 662-64. The
Hillman Court could easily have adopted the analysis of the dissenters in Ridgway and Wissner
and held that Hillman was not governed by those cases.
28. Yet, as Professor Langbein notes, the Supreme Court has held that the constructivetrust remedy is permitted under ERISA's enforcement provision authorizing "appropriate
equitable relief." See Langbein, supra note 6, at 1679 & n.67; ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2012). In Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356
(2006), an ERISA-regulated health insurance plan paid medical expenses on behalf of the
Sereboffs, who were insured plan participants. The plan contained a subrogation clause entitling
the insurer to reimbursement for such payments in the event of a subsequent tort recovery. Id.
at 359-61. The Court sustained the insurer's right to "a constructive trust or equitable lien,"
which the Court called a "familiar rul[e] of equity." Id. at 364 (citation omitted).
29. Sadly, too, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief supporting preemption in
Hillman. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Hillman
v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013) (No. 11-1221). He also seemed unaware of the movement
toward unifying the law of probate and nonprobate transfers and questioned the policy of the
divorce-revocation statute. The Solicitor General argued that a "divorced federal employee might
want his ex-spouse to receive insurance proceeds for a number of reasons-out of a sense of
obligation, remorse, or continuing affection, or to help care for children of the marriage that
remain in the ex-spouse's custody." Id. at 28. The preempted divorce-revocation rule rests on the
rebuttable presumption that the divorced spouse would not want the ex-spouse to benefit, but
the rule espoused by the Solicitor General and adopted by the Court in effect creates the opposite
presumption.
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applies to the decedent's net probate estate, just as the federal estate
tax would be ineffective if it only taxed the value of the decedent's net
probate estate. 30 Expanding upon statutes in New York and
Pennsylvania, 3 1 the 1969 UPC developed the concept of the
augmented estate. Under the 1969 UPC, the surviving spouse s
elective share is applied to the decedent's net probate estate
augmented by the death-time value of specified will-substitute
transfers, including "any transfer during the marriage whereby
property is held at the time of decedent's death by decedent and
another with right of survivorship." 32 The 1990 revisions to the UPC's
elective share expand the augmented estate to include the value of
"the decedent's ownership interest in property or accounts held in
POD, TOD, or co-ownership registration with the right of
survivorship." 33 About thirty-seven percent of the non-community
property states-mainly those that have adopted the UPC reformsextend their elective-share laws to nonprobate transfers. 34 The ALI's
Restatement of Property promulgates UPC-type anti-evasion rules as
common-law rules. 35

A. ERISA, FEGLIA, and Other FederalStatutes Authorizing or
Regulating Nonprobate Transfers
By extension, Egelhoff and Hillman probably mean that state
elective-share anti-evasion laws as well as divorce-revocation laws are
preempted by ERISA and other federal statutes authorizing or
regulating nonprobate transfers. 36 ERISA itself, as amended by the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REAct"), 37 protects the rights of a

30. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, MaritalProperty Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REV. 21,
56 (1994).
31.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 2014); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2203
(2014).
32. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(1)(iii) (amended 2010).
33. Id. § 2-205(1)(C).
34. Elective-share laws extend to nonprobate transfers in Alaska, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia. ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.205 (2013); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 902 (2014); FLA. STAT. § 732.2035 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-205
(2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-6a205 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 2-201 (2013); MINN. STAT.
§ 524.2-205 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-222 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314 (2013); N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1A (McKinney 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 (2013); 20
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2203 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-205 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2205 (LexisNexis 2013); W. VA. CODE § 42-3-2 (2014).
35.
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 9.1 cmt. i.
36. See Gallanis,supranote 6, at 190-92.
37. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
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surviving spouse in an employee spouse's ERISA-covered pension
plan. 38 But REAct does not apply to FEGLIA, the federal life
insurance act at issue in Hillman, nor does it apply to other federally
authorized or regulated life insurance acts, including those involved in
Wissner v. Wissner 39 (National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940) and
Ridgway v. Ridgway40 (Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act of
1965), cases that the Supreme Court needlessly found controlling in
Hillman.4 1 So, except for ERISA-covered plans, a decedent's surviving
spouse has no protection with respect to federal statutes authorizing
or regulating nonprobate transfers.

B. U.S. Government Securities in Survivorship Form
Federal law provides another means of dodging state antievasion rules. Unlike nonprobate arrangements available only to
specific subsets of the general public, such as federal government
employees or employees whose pension plans are covered by ERISA,
this one is available to the public at large: Purchase U.S. government
securities in survivorship form. The Constitution grants to Congress
the power "to borrow Money on the credit of the United States." 42
Congress has delegated that power to the Secretary of the Treasury. 43
The Secretary has issued regulations that provide that the survivor of
any U.S. government security registered in survivorship form is the
sole and absolute owner.44 The purpose of granting sole and absolute
ownership is to "give investors the assurance that the forms of
registration they select will establish conclusively the right to
their . . . securities.

. .

.

It

will

have

the

effect

of

overriding

inconsistent State laws." The Supreme Court in Free v. Bland4 6
agreed, holding that any contrary state law is preempted.4 7 The
45

38. With respect to marriages ending at death, REAct creates spousal interests in the form
of survivorship rights. If the employee spouse survives to retirement age, the pension must be
paid as a "qualified joint and survivor annuity" ("QJSA'). If the employee spouse dies before
retirement age and his or her pension is vested, the surviving spouse is entitled to a "qualified
preretirement survivor annuity" ("QPSA"). These two types of REAct annuities are discussed in
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 285-86 (5th ed. 2010).

39.
40.
41.
42.

338 U.S. 655, 658 (1950).
454 U.S. 46, 56 (1981).
See supra note 27.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.

43.
44.

31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 3102-3106 (2012).
31 C.F.R. §§ 315.20, 315.70, 357.21 (2011).

45.
46.
47.

Id. § 357 app. A (2012).
369 U.S. 663 (1962).
Id. at 666.
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contrary state law in Free was the Texas community property law, but
a New York court 4 8 has held that the same rule overrides the elective
share of the surviving spouse as well.4 9 Had these state laws not been
preempted, federally authorized or regulated nonprobate transfers
would only be subject to the surviving spouse's elective share in states
whose elective-share law reaches nonprobate transfers.5 0
Preemption does not necessarily reduce the amount that the
surviving spouse takes. The value of any U.S. government security in
survivorship form can still be included in the UPC's augmented estate.
Preemption simply means that the survivor takes the security. Other
takers of amounts included in the augmented estate must contribute
more to make up the deficiency. 51 A problem arises, however, if those
amounts are insufficient to make up the deficiency or if there are no
other takers. In such cases, federal preemption does reduce or even
eliminate the surviving spouse's share.
The means of evading the elective share is therefore apparent:
Spouses who want to disinherit their surviving spouses need only
convert as much of their liquid wealth as possible to U.S. government
securities in survivorship form with third-party donees, so that as
little as possible remains for their surviving spouses. The UPC has a
post-distribution rule similar to the Virginia rule at issue in
Hillman.52 In the light of Hillman, the UPC post-distribution rule
would also be preempted. Because the Treasury Department has
decided that the survivor of any U.S. government security registered
in survivorship form is the sole and absolute owner notwithstanding
"any inconsistent State laws," 53 it is hard to believe that the Court
would allow federal common law to change that result.

48.

In re Estate of Schemer, 535 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (Sur. Ct. 1988).

49.

Id.

50. For a list of those states, see supra note 34.
51.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-209 (amended 2010). The same point applies to life
insurance or pension benefits under other federally authorized or federally regulated nonprobate
transfers, such as ERISA or FEGLIA, but those nonprobate transfers are only available to
subsets of the general population.
52. Id. § 2-210(b).
53.
31 C.F.R. § 357 app. A (2012). These regulations are issued by the Bureau of the Public
Debt, a division of the Treasury Department. On February 23, 1996, and October 2, 1996, 1 wrote
on behalf of the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code (later named the Joint
Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts) to the head of the Bureau, asking for
reconsideration of the preemption of state elective-share law on the grounds that those
regulations were written when state elective-share law only applied to wills and did not apply to
nonprobate transfers, and so elective-share law could not have been the federal government's
original concern. No one from the federal agency responded to either letter. For details, see
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 620 (3d ed. 2002).
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The conclusion is inescapable: Despite the best efforts of the
ULC and the ALI to prevent evasion of the surviving spouse's elective
share, federal law has made evasion possible by those determined to
disinherit their spouses. 54

IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS REGARDING INITIAL
VALIDITY OF BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS

Although the Supreme Court in Hillman said that the FEGLIA
life insurance proceeds "belong to the named beneficiary and no
other,"55 and although Treasury regulations provide that the survivor
of any U.S. government security registered in survivorship form is the
"sole and absolute owner,"5 6 those propositions surely cannot stand if
the beneficiary designation would have been initially invalid due to
incapacity, undue influence, or defective execution.5 7
No case has reached the Supreme Court on issues of initial
validity, but the Supreme Court has held that ERISA gaps concerning
contract and tort law must be filled, not by the law of an individual
state, but by federal common law.5 8 Although divorce-revocation and
elective-share law is preempted by federal statute and not replaced by
federal common law, a different pattern has emerged from the
decisions of the lower federal courts in both pre- and post-Egelhoff
cases on questions of initial validity of the beneficiary designation:
Federal common law replaces preempted state law on these questions.
The problem with mandating the use of federal common law is that
there is no preexisting body of federal common law that deals with

54. On May 20, 2009, President Obama issued a memorandum to the heads of executive
departments and agencies, stating that "the general policy of my Administration [is] that
preemption of State law by executive departments and agencies should be undertaken only with
full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal basis for
preemption." Preemption: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (May 20, 2009). To a similar effect, see Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206
(2000), and Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987). These presidential orders have not led
the Treasury Department to reconsider its regulations regarding U.S. government securities held
in survivorship form.
55.
See supra text accompanying note 20.
56. See supra text accompanying note 44.
57. Cf Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 154 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Leon

E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: JudicialFlexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 109, 111 (1985) ("Congress enacted ERISA while still oblivious to
numerous problems related to benefit plans that the states had already recognized and
addressed.").
58. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987); see also Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111-12 (1989) (holding that an employer's fiduciary duties
under ERISA are controlled by federal common law).
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these questions. As a result, the federal courts are forced to fashion
federal common law from scratch on these questions.5 9
In an early ERISA breach-of-contract case, Singer v. Black &
60 the Fourth Circuit stated this guiding principle:
Decker Corporation,
"In fashioning federal common law, courts do not look to the law of a
particular state, but rather should apply common-law doctrines best
suited to furthering the goals of ERISA. Consequently, federal
common law should be consistent across the circuits." 61
As we shall see, the Fourth Circuit's guiding principle has not
been consistently followed in wealth-transfer cases, and hence federal
common law in those cases is inconsistent across the circuits.
Although the lower federal courts agree that state law is preempted
and replaced by federal common law, they are not always rigorous in
stating the sources on which they base federal common law.

A. Lack of Mental Capacity
In a pre-Egelhoff case, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Hall,62 the federal district court for Maryland applied the following
federal common-law standard of mental capacity:
To be capable of effecting a valid change of beneficiary a person should have clearness of
mind and memory sufficient to know the nature of the property for which he is about to
name a beneficiary, the nature of the act which he is about to perform, the names and
identities of those who are the natural objects of his bounty; his relationship towards
63
them, and the consequences of his act, uninfluenced by any material delusions.

B. Undue Influence
64 a pre-Egelhoff case,
In Tinsley v. General Motors Corporation,

a change-of-beneficiary form in an ERISA-covered life insurance policy
was challenged on the ground that it was procured by undue
influence. 65 The General Motors employee died domiciled in
Michigan.6 6 The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan case law of

59. See Thomason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that
where ERISA is silent, courts must develop federal common law and, in so doing, may use state
common law as a basis, to the extent that state law is not inconsistent with congressional policy
concerns).
60. 964 F.2d 1449 (4th Cir. 1993).
61. Id. at 1453.
62.
9 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 1998).
63. Id. at 564 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1953)).
64. 227 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2000).
65. Id. at 702.
66. Id.
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undue influence was preempted and that the case was controlled by
federal common law. 67

C. Substantial Compliancefor Defective Execution
Employees often fill out beneficiary designation forms or
change-of-beneficiary forms without the benefit of counsel. 68 The
forms can also be confusing and can lead to defective execution of the
correct form or to correct execution of the wrong form. 69
Although the Fourth Circuit in Singer said that, in fashioning
federal common law, the "courts do not look to the law of a particular
state," the same circuit, in a later case, Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Adams,70 said that "federal courts may draw on state common
law in shaping the applicable body of federal common law."7 1 The
court in Phoenix endorsed the following statement of federal common
law of substantial compliance:
[A]n insured substantially complies with the change of beneficiary provisions of an
ERISA life insurance policy when the insured: (1) evidences his or her intent to make
the change and (2) attempts to effectuate the change by undertaking positive action
which is for all practical purposes similar to the action required by the change of
beneefiiary provisions of the policy.

72

Although Phoenix was a pre-Egelhoff case, 73 the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits have applied the Phoenix test in post-Egelhoff
cases. 74 Applying the Phoenix test, the Seventh Circuit found that an

67. Id. at 704.
68. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 12, at 211.
69. Id. at 188, 190.
70. 30 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 1994).
71. Id. at 564.
72. Id.
73. In other pre-Egelhoff cases, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits followed the Phoenix test.
See Hill v. AT&T Corp., 125 F.3d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1997); Estate of Altobelli v. Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1996). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, however, have held that
states' substantial-compliance doctrines were not preempted. See BankAmerica Pension Plan v.
McMath, 206 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2000); Peckham v. Gem State Mut., 964 F.2d 1043, 1052-54
(10th Cir. 1992).
74. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Finch, 395 F.3d 238, 240-41 (5th Cir. 2004); Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 567 (7th Cir. 2002); accord Prudential Ins. Co. v. Schmid, 337 F.
Supp. 2d 325, 329-30 (D. Mass. 2004). Although the employee in the Schmid case telephoned his
employer's customer service representatives saying that he wanted to change the beneficiary on
an insurance policy from his daughter to his second wife, he did not substantially comply with
the change-of-beneficiary requirements. Id. at 327. Because of a transmission error by the
customer service representative, he did not complete a change-of-beneficiary form before he died.
Id. The Sixth Circuit is alone in refusing to recognize a federal common-law doctrine of
substantial compliance. See Kmatz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 232 Fed. App'x 451, 456 (6th Cir.
2007); Unicare Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Craig, 157 Fed. App'x 787, 791 (6th Cir. 2005).
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unsigned change-of-beneficiary form was valid on the ground that the
failure to sign was a "careless error." 75
V. THE ROLES OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW

The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to confirm the
use of federal common law on questions of initial validity, but it is
difficult to imagine that the Court would reject the application of such
law in cases of mental incapacity or undue influence. Invalidity due to
mental incapacity or undue influence is universal law. It is hoped that
the Court would also confirm the use of federal common law of
substantial compliance in cases of defective execution. Nearly all
states follow such a doctrine for defective execution of life insurance
beneficiary designations. 7 6 Because the Court has not spoken on
issues of initial validity, it is even possible that the Court would hold
that state laws on these questions are not preempted in the first place,
on the ground that state laws on mental capacity and undue
influence-and perhaps substantial compliance as well-do not
conflict with Congress' scheme in enacting ERISA, FEGLIA, and
similar federal statutes.7 7
Assuming that the Supreme Court would approve of replacing
preempted state law with federal common law on questions of initial
validity, what are appropriate sources of federal common law?
As noted earlier, the Fourth Circuit's guiding principle in the
Singer case is that "federal common law should be consistent across
the circuits." 7 8 In practice, however, the lower federal courts' efforts to
develop federal common law have been inconsistent. The substantialcompliance test in Phoenix was fashioned by the district court,79 which
based the formulation on two sources: a federal district court decision
from the Eastern District of Missouri8 0 and a treatise on insurance.81
The federal district court in Missouri fashioned the formulation from
Missouri case law. 82 The Maryland federal district court in Hall

75. Davis v. Combes, 294 F.3d 931, 942 (7th Cir. 2002).
76. See 6 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 83.15 (1995); Meredith H. Bogart, Note, State
Doctrines of Substantial Compliance: A Call for ERISA Preemption and Uniform Federal
Common Law Doctrine, 25 CARDOzO L. REV. 447, 469-73 (2003).
77. See supra note 21; cf Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 153-61 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

964 F.2d 1449, 1453 (4th Cir. 1993).
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 828 F. Supp. 379, 388 (D.S.C. 1993).
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 770 F. Supp. 1393 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
19 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 82.76, at 871 (1984).
Metro. Life, 770 F. Supp. at 1397.
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derived the mental incapacity standard from Taylor v. United States, 83
a decision of the federal district court for the Western District of
Arkansas. The Arkansas federal district court based that standard on
a decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas and two legal

encyclopedias: Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence.
The Sixth Circuit in Tinsley stated that "we look to state-law
principles for guidance."8 4 The court then extracted federal common
law of undue influence for the Sixth Circuit from cases from Michigan,
85
Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and from American Jurisprudence.
The federal courts have therefore based federal common law variously
on state case law from Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio,
and Tennessee, on an insurance treatise, and on two legal
encyclopedias.
The only consistency in the development of federal common law
is that the lower federal courts have overlooked the most accessible,
unifying, and reliable sources for determining federal common law:
the ALI's Restatements and the ULC's uniform laws.8 6 Yet, in other
contexts, the Court has relied on Restatements for guidance. For

example, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Bruch,87 the Court
noted that ERISA "abounds with the language and terminology of
trust law."8 8 Although ERISA itself did not direct the source of trust
law, the Court referred generously to the Restatement of Trusts in
developing federal common law of rights and obligations under
ERISA-regulated plans.8 9 In United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp.,90 the Third Circuit referred to the Restatement of Torts in
developing federal common law of joint and several liability. 9 1

83.
113 F. Supp. 143, 148 (W.D. Ark. 1953), aff'd, 211 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1954).
84. Tinsley v. General Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2000).
85. Id. at 704-05.
86. On mental incapacity, see PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 8.1. On undue
influence and fraud, see id. § 8.3. Although the Uniform Probate Code does not address
substantial compliance for insurance-beneficiary designations, the Restatement provides that
the harmless-error rule for execution of wills, see id. § 3.3, applies to the creation, revocation, or
amendment of will substitutes, including the designation or change of beneficiary. See

id. § 7.2 cmt. d.
Scholars have long argued that federal common law should be derived from the
Restatements or uniform laws to achieve uniformity. See Gallanis, supra note 6, at 189-90, 195-

96; David S. Lebolt, Making the Best of Egelhoff: Federal Common Law for ERISA-Preempted
Beneficiary Designations,28 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE, no. 3, Fall 2002, at 29, 51-54.
87. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
88. Id. at 110.
89. Id. at 111-12. The Court also referred to the standard treatises on trust law by Austin
Wakeman Scott and George G. Bogert. Id. at 111.
90. 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
91. Id. at 268-69.
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Restatements may be a more appropriate source for federal
common law for a reason apart from their uses in Firestone Tire &
Rubber and Alcan Aluminum. The purpose of Restatements is to unify
state common-law principles, whereas uniform laws achieve
uniformity only by state legislative enactment. 92
Although federal common law, preferably derived from
Restatements, is an acceptable alternative to nonpreemption in cases
of initial validity, federal common law is problematic in some cases if,
as the Fourth Circuit stated in Singer, federal common law "should be
consistent across the circuits." The problem arises when state wealthtransfer law is itself not uniform, especially when the lack of
uniformity relates to the fundamental question of whether the state
law extends to nonprobate transfers.
As noted earlier, divorce-revocation laws extend to nonprobate
transfers in about thirty percent of the states, and elective-share laws
extend to nonprobate transfers in about thirty-seven percent of the
non-community property states. 93 Although the ALI now bases
Restatement provisions on a minority view if that view is considered
the better view, 9 4 it is probably unrealistic to expect federal courts to
adopt minority positions as federal common law for all states even
when supported by a Restatement. In such cases, holding that state
law is not preempted has the advantage of uniformity-not across
state lines, but within each state-regarding nonprobate transfers
that are and those that are not authorized or regulated by federal law.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Eglehoff and Hillman opted for
preemption-period. The unhappy result is that former spouses can
benefit, but surviving spouses can be disinherited.

92. Although uniform laws are not enacted in all states, there is state-law precedent for
looking to a uniform law for guidance even in states that have not enacted the law. See, e.g.,
Ruotolo v. Tietjen, 890 A2d 166, 177 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006), aff'd per curiam, 916 A.2d 1 (Conn.
2007); Allen v. Dalk, 826 So. 2d 245, 250 (Fla. 2002); In re Will of Ranney, 589 A2d 1339, 1343
(N.J. 1991).
93.
See supra notes 12 and 34.
94. The Institute's mission is "to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and
its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to
encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work." See AMERICAN LAW INST.,
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION (1923), available at http://www.ali.org/doc/charter.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/9QYV-8QQA. The Restatement provides that the divorce-revocation and
elective-share laws extend to nonprobate transfers and presents them as common-law rules. See
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at §§ 4.1 cmt. p. (divorce revocation), 9.1 cmt. i (elective
share).
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VI. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE WILL-EXECUTION FORMALITIES
FOR MILITARY WILLS

Not all federal preemption of state wealth-transfer law is
harmful. A case in point is a federal statute that expressly preempts
state will-execution formalities for military wills.
Historically, soldiers in active military service and mariners or
sailors at sea were excused from the more rigorous testamentary
formalities,9 5 and comparable measures still exist in some probate
codes. 96 The UPC contains no such dispensation.
Most states, including the UPC, have a choice-of-law provision
recognizing the validity of a will executed in compliance with the law
at the time of execution of the place where the will is executed.9 7
Because military personnel are based throughout the country and in
many foreign countries, 98 state choice-of-law provisions might not be
sufficient to validate all wills executed by military personnel. So, in
2000, Congress enacted a federal will-execution statute for members of
the armed forces and their dependents. The statute was buried in the
broader National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001
("NDAA"). 9 9 In the NDAA, military wills are called "military
testamentary instruments."

The NDAA constitutes a mini federal probate code limited to
will execution. The federal statute provides that a military
testamentary instrument must (1) be executed by a "person eligible for

95.
See Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, §§ 19-21, 23 (Eng.); Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will.
4 & 1 Vict., c. 26, § 11 (U.K.).
96. See Nowell D. Bamberger, Are Military Testamentary Instruments UnconstitutionalWhy Compliance with State Testamentary FormalityRequirements Remains Essential, 196 MIL.
L. REV. 91, 124-25 (2008).
97. Section 2-506 of the UPC provides that a
written will is valid if . .. its execution complies with the law at the time of execution
of the place where the will is executed, or, of the law of the place where at the time of
execution or at the time of death the testator is domiciled, has a place of abode or is a
national.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-2506 (amended 2010).
98. See List of United States Military Bases, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List ofUnitedStates military-bases, archived at http://perma.cc/KM6P-Y67Z (last visited Aug.
28, 2014).
99. Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-398, § 551(a), 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-123 (2000) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1044d (2012))
(describing military wills in a section entitled "Military testamentary instruments: requirement
for recognition by States"). For Department of Defense regulations regarding military
testamentary instruments, see Dep't of Def. Directive 1350.4, Legal Assistance Matters (Apr. 28,
2001),
32
C.F.R.
§
153.4,
available
at
http://regulations.vlex.com/vid/
testamentary-instruments-attorney-advance-22952048, archived at http://perma.cc/DX5Z-TEZ5.
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military legal assistance,"1 00 (2) be executed in accordance with
prescribed formalities, and (3) make a disposition of the property of
the testator. 101 To be valid as a military testamentary instrument, the
will must also be executed by the testator in the presence of a military
legal assistance counsel 102 acting as presiding attorney and at least
two disinterested witnesses, each of whom attests to witnessing the
testator's execution of the instrument by signing it. 103 The statute also
authorizes the use of a self-proving affidavit. 104 Although the federal
statute does not say so expressly, a properly executed military will
should continue to be treated as a validly executed military will even
after the military member is discharged or retires. To assure that
state probate courts accept military wills as validly executed, the
NDAA provides:
A military testamentary instrument (1) is exempt from any requirement of form,
formality, or recording before probate that is provided for testamentary instruments
under the laws of a State; and (2) has the same legal effect as a testamentary
instrument prepared and executed in accordance with the laws of the State in which it
is presented for probate. 1o

Military personnel are executing these federal wills. The
Department of Defense ("DoD") directs all commanding officers to
urge military personnel to seek legal counsel regarding an estate plan
well before mobilization, deployment, or similar activities."10 6
Enclosure El of the DoD Directive provides the preamble for military
testamentary instruments that the statute requires:
This is a MILITARY TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENT prepared pursuant to section
1044d of title 10, United States Code, and executed by a person authorized to receive
legal assistance from the Military Services. Federal law exempts this document from
any requirement of form, formality, or recording that is provided for testamentary

100. A "person eligible for military legal assistance" is a member of the armed forces who is
on active duty, a member or former member entitled to retired or retainer pay or equivalent pay,
an officer of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service who is on active duty or entitled
to retired or equivalent pay, or a dependent of such a person. 10 U.S.C. § 1044(a)(1) (2012).
101. Under the UPC, a will need not dispose of property, but can act solely to revoke a prior
will, nominate a guardian, appoint an executor, or disinherit an heir. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 1-201(57) (amended 2010).
102. The term "military legal assistance counsel" is defined as (a) a judge advocate as
defined in 10 U.S.C. § 801(13), i.e., an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the Army
or the Navy, an officer of the Air Force or the Marine Corps who is designated as a judge
advocate, or a commissioned officer of the Coast Guard designated for special duty (law); or (b) a
civilian attorney serving as a legal assistance officer under 10 U.S.C. § 1044, i.e., a civilian
attorney who is a member of the bar of a federal court or of the highest court of a state.

Id. § 1044d(g).
103. Id. § 1044d(c).
104. Id. § 1044d(d).
105. Id. § 1044d(a).
106. Dep't of Def. Directive 1350.4, supra note 99,

§ 4.1.3.
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instruments under the laws of a State, the District of Columbia, or a commonwealth
territory, or possession of the United States. Federal law specifies that this document
shall receive the same legal effect as a testamentary instrument prepared and executed
in accordance with the laws of the State in which it is presented for probate. 107

The federal execution formalities satisfy the requirements of
most but not all states.10 8 Perhaps because compliance with the
federal formalities for executing a military will satisfies the willexecution formalities of most states, there has been no litigation over
the validity of a particular military will 09 nor over the
constitutionality of the federal statute preempting state will-execution
law.110

107. Id. at E1.
108. Compliance with the federal formalities satisfies the formalities of the UPC, see UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010), but does not satisfy the formalities of all states. Under
Louisiana law, the testator must sign the will in the presence of two witnesses and a notary and
must sign at the end and on each page, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1577 (2013), but the federal
statute has no such requirements. Under some state statutes, the witnesses must sign in the
presence of each other, see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-104 (2014), but the federal statute has
no such requirement. Under some state statutes, the testator must declare to the witnesses that
the document is his or her will, see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103 (2013); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW

§ 3-2.1

(McKinney 2014), but the federal statute has no such explicit requirement.

Under some state statutes, the testator must sign the will "at the end," see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 28-25-103, but the federal statute has no such requirement. Also, as noted supra note 101, a
will under the Uniform Probate Code and other state statutes need not dispose of property, but
can act solely to revoke a prior will, nominate a guardian, appoint an executor, or disinherit an
heir, see, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(57) (amended 2010), but the federal statute requires
the will to dispose of property in order to qualify as a military testamentary instrument.
109. The only decision found is Auclair v. Auclair, C.A. No. PC 2012-3714, 2013 R.I. Super
LEXIS 174 (Sept. 18, 2013), but that case decided that Rhode Island was the decedent's state of
domicile at death. Whether the decedent's military testamentary instrument was validly
executed was not an issue in the case.
110. The constitutionality of the federal statute has not been tested. One commentator,
Nowell Bamberger, has argued that the statute is unconstitutional. See Bamberger, supra note
96, at 108-10. Under the Tenth Amendment, "[P]owers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States." To be constitutional,
federal preemption of state will-execution formalities for military wills must come under one of
the enumerated powers granted to Congress. Despite the contrary argument of that one
commentator, the federal military-will statute is almost certainly constitutional under the war
powers granted to Congress by Article I, Section 8. This follows from the Court's decision in
United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961), which upheld the constitutionality of a federal
statute requiring the personal property of veterans who die in a veterans' hospital without a will
or heirs to pass to the United States rather than escheat to the state. In that case, the Court
said:
The fact that [the federal law] pertains to the devolution of property does not render it
invalid. Although it is true that this is an area normally left to the States, it is not
immune under the Tenth Amendment from laws passed by the Federal Government
which are, as is the law here, necessary and proper to the exercise of a delegated
power.
Id. at 649; see also Gerry W. Beyer, Introduction to Military Wills, PROFESSORBEYER.COM,
http://www.professorbeyer.com/Archive/new-site/Articles/MilitaryWills.html (last visited Aug.
28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NY35-VMYA.
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The NDAA only deals with will execution. The statute does not
provide that the beneficiaries of military wills are entitled to take
their bequests and devises. The only federal preemption question is
whether the execution of the wills complies with statutory formalities.
State-law wealth-transfer doctrines-such as revocation by act or
subsequent will, divorce revocation, elective share of the decedent's
surviving spouse, antilapse, lack of mental capacity,"' undue
influence, the slayer rule, and probate procedures- should be just as
applicable to military wills as they are to nonmilitary wills.
Universal acceptance of military wills is a worthy goal, 112 but
federal preemption of state-law execution requirements is not
foolproof. A few states have put the matter at rest by providing that a
will executed in accordance with the federal statute is deemed to be
validly executed under state law. A Vermont statute, for example,
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a military will containing a provision
stating that the will is prepared pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1044d shall be deemed to be
legally executed and shall be of the same force and effect as if executed in the mode
11 3
prescribed by the laws of this state.

VII. PROMOTING PERPETUAL TRUSTS 11 4
For centuries, Anglo-American law has curtailed excessive
dead-hand control through the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities
(the "common-law Rule"). Judicial concern about excessive dead-hand
control appeared as early as the seventeenth century when Lord
Nottingham, in the Duke of Norfolk's Case,1 15 upheld the trust at issue
but suggested that there was a limit "when any inconvenience
appears." The courts thereafter developed the common-law Rule caseby-case over a long period of time. As developed by the courts, and as
crystallized in the late nineteenth century by Harvard Law School
Professor John Chipman Gray, the common-law Rule came to be
stated as follows: "No [contingent future] interest [in real or personal
111. State statutes require the testator to be "of sound mind" and of a certain age (typically
eighteen) in order to execute a valid will, see, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (amended 2010),
but the federal statute has no such requirements. A few state statutes waive the age
requirement for wills of members of the armed forces. See, e.g., TEx. ESTATES CODE
ANN. § 251.001 (2014).
112. Full disclosure: I served as a member of the armed forces from 1966 to 1968.
113. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 7 (2013). Florida has enacted a similar statute. See FLA.
STAT. § 732.502 (2014).
114. For greater detail, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress Promotes Perpetual Trusts:
Why? (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 349, 2014),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326524, archived at http://perma.cc/N45X-6E2Q.
115. (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.).
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property] is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twentyone years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."1 1 6
As a mechanism for curtailing excessive dead-hand control, the
common-law Rule was poorly designed. One flaw was that it
invalidated a contingent future interest on the basis of what might
happen in the future, not on the basis of what actually happened in
the future. In the late twentieth century, reform efforts to correct this
flaw started taking hold. In 1986, the ULC promulgated the Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities ("USRAP"), which provided that a
contingent future interest that would be valid under the common-law
Rule remains valid at the outset, but a contingent future interest that
would be invalid under the common-law Rule is only invalid if it does
not actually vest or fail to vest within ninety years. 117 USRAP was
incorporated into the UPC118 and came to be enacted in over half of
the states.
USRAP was on its way to even wider enactment when
Congress intervened, with the effect of stalling and then reversing its
progress. Congress' intervention has also prevented the additional
perpetuity reforms promulgated by the ALI from taking hold: In place
of a lives-in-being-plus-twenty-one-years limit, the Restatement
(Third) of Property adopts a two-younger-generations limit and
requires a trust to terminate and its principal distributed outright if
the trust exceeds that limit.11 9
Congress' intervention occurred in 1986 when it enacted the
current incarnation of the federal generation-skipping transfer tax
("GST tax"). 120 The GST tax imposes a flat tax at the highest federal
estate tax rate (forty percent as of 2013) on generation-skipping
transfers. 12 1 The purpose of the GST tax is to make sure that property
is taxed every time it shifts from generation to generation or skips a
generation.
As part of the GST tax, Congress exempted trusts up to a
certain value. The ceiling on the GST exemption started out at $1
million, but it is now $5.34 million for individuals (double that for
married couples). The GST exemption, 122 not the GST tax itself,
sparked a perpetual-trust movement. When Congress granted the
exemption, it failed to impose a durational limit on exempt trusts.
§ 201 (2d ed. 1906).
§ 1(a) (amended 1990).

116.

JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

117.

See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-901 to -906 (amended 2010).
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 27.1-3.
I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (2012).
See id. §§ 2641, 2001.
Id. § 2631.
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Congress relied on state perpetuity laws to supply that limit. At the
instigation of state banking groups and estate-planning attorneys,
states began to pass legislation allowing settlors to create perpetual
trusts-trusts that can last for several centuries or even forever. 123
Because Congress has not acted to close the tax loophole, 124 the
perpetual-trust movement is in full bloom. With state perpetuity laws
out of the way, the wealthy created and continue to create perpetual
trusts in significant numbers. An empirical study found that roughly
$100 billion in trust assets had flowed into states allowing perpetual
trusts. 125 The study was based on data through 2003 from the annual
reports that institutional trustees file with federal banking
authorities. Considerably more wealth has undoubtedly moved into
these states in the years following 2003.126

123. See Ira Mark Bloom, How Federal Transfer Taxes Affect the Development of Property
Law, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 661, 673 (2000) ("The very recent perpetuities repeal movement is the
best example of how federal transfer tax laws affect the development of property law in the worst
of ways."); see also Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail Is Killing The Rule Against Perpetuities,
87 TAx NOTES 569, 569 (2000).
124. On February 21, 2014, the House Ways and Means Committee unveiled its longawaited proposal for comprehensive tax reform, but the proposal does not address the GST
exemption for perpetual trusts. See Tax Reform Act of 2014 (Discussion Draft 2014), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/statutory-text-tax-reform-act-of 2014 discussion
draft_022614.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B6SY-EQ8V. The prospect for enactment
of comprehensive
tax reform
in
the
113th
Congress
appears
bleak
in
any
event. See Lori Montgomery, McConnell: Tax Reform is Dead, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Feb. 25,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/02/25/breaking-mcconnell-killstax-reform, archived at http://perma.cc/7FNX-B4SC (noting Minority Leader McConnells doubt
that any tax reform bill will pass in 2014).
125. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuitiesand Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 410-11 (2005). The
study found that the states that attracted the most perpetual-trust business were those that do
not tax trust income produced by funds originating from out of state. See id. States that levy an
income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state experienced no observable increase in trust
business. See id. at 420. The $100 billion trust figure did not represent the value of GST-exempt
perpetual trusts. See id. at 411. It appears that the payoff for institutional trustees operating in
these perpetual-trust states is that "high net worth clients" create perpetual trusts up to the
GST exemption limit and also move the greater bulk of their wealth into non-exempt trusts with
the same institutional trustee.
126. I have previously questioned whether the state legislators who vote to authorize
perpetual trusts and the wealthy who create them have thought through what they are allowing
or putting in place, in view of the fact that these trusts can have as many as 450 living
beneficiaries 150 years after creation, more than 7,000 living beneficiaries after 250 years, and
more than 114,000 living beneficiaries after 350 years. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, From Here to
Eternity: The Folly of Perpetual Trusts 5 (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 259, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975117, archived at
http://perma.cc/UYF4-6WMP. After 125 years, the settlor's genetic relationship to all his thenliving beneficiaries will drop below one percent, and as the trust presses on into the more distant
future, the settlor's genetic relationship to the beneficiaries will decline further as the trust
benefits ever more remote relatives. See id. at 8-9.
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Not only is there no federal interest in promoting perpetually
GST-exempt trusts, the federal interest cuts the other way. Tax
revenues will be lost by Congress' action and subsequent inaction. The
longer Congress procrastinates, the amount of wealth safely sheltered
in perpetually GST-exempt trusts will continue to grow. 127
VIII.

SOCIAL SECURITY SURVIVOR

BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN OF
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION

The previous topics dealt with federal preemption of state law
regarding transfers of assets belonging to the transferor. This topic is
a change of direction. Federal law in this instance has embraced state
wealth-transfer law, not preempted it. The topic is the right of
children of assisted reproduction ("ART children") to Social Security
survivor benefits. Congress has chosen to make the right to these
federal benefits depend on state intestacy law. Although this is a case
in which uniformity is desirable, state intestacy law is far from
uniform and is silent regarding the intestacy rights of ART children in
many states. 128
Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1939 to provide a
monthly benefit for children of a deceased insured wage earner.
Section 202(d)(1) 129 provides that every "child" of a deceased wage
earner is entitled to a monthly benefit if the child was dependent upon
the wage earner at the time of death.
In determining whether an applicant is the child of a deceased
wage earner, Section 216(h)(2)(A) 130 provides that the Commissioner
of Social Security "shall apply such law as would be applied in
determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the
courts of the State in which such individual is domiciled . .. at the

time of his death." Regulations issued under the auspices of the
Commissioner of Social Security define the word "child" as one who
would inherit under the intestate succession law of the state of
domicile of the deceased wage earner. 131

127. See Zachary R. Mider, Moguls Rent South Dakota Addresses to Shelter Wealth Forever,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 27, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-27/
moguls-rent-south-dakota-addresses-to-dodge-taxes-forever.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/
5UK6-K8NP (reporting on wealthy families who have created dynasty trusts in South Dakota).
128. Another area of nonuniformity is the right of adopted children to inherit from their
genetic parents. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119 (amended 2010). Adopted children commonly
inherit from their adopting parents. See id. § 2-118.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2012).
130. Id. § 416(h)(2)(A).
131. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (2014).
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In 1939, intestacy rights of children were nearly uniform, 132
but state law has now become inconsistent on the question of intestacy
rights of posthumously conceived ART children. In Astrue v. Capato,1 33
the Supreme Court had to decide whether Social Security survivor
benefits for posthumously conceived ART children still depend on
disparate state intestacy laws. Robert Capato, who was married to
Karen Capato, developed cancer. Before undergoing chemotherapy, he
deposited semen in a sperm bank, where it was frozen and stored.
Robert died a couple of years later. Shortly after his death, Karen
began in vitro fertilization with his frozen sperm and, eighteen
months after his death, gave birth to twins. Karen claimed Social
Security survivor benefits on behalf of the twins.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the
circuits. 1 34 Justice Ginsberg delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court, holding that the Social Security Administration's reading that
defines the word "child" as a child who would inherit by intestacy1 35 "is
better attuned to the statute's text and its design to benefit primarily
those supported by the deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime."
The Court added that "even if the SSA's longstanding interpretation is
not the only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction
that garners the Court's respect under [the Chevron Doctrine]." 136
The Court was well aware that posthumous conception of ART
children is such a new development that state intestacy laws
regarding the intestacy rights of those children have only sporadically
caught up to the phenomenon. The Court was also aware that the

132. Back then, nonmarital children inherited from their mothers but not from their fathers
unless certain conditions were met. In the wake of Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), and
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), nonmarital children now inherit from their mothers and
fathers. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-117.
133. 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2025-26 (2012).
134. Circuit court cases holding that survivor benefits do not depend on state intestacy law
are Capato u. Commissioner of Social Security, 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2013), and Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Circuit court cases holding the opposite are Beeler v.
Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), and Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011).
135. See supra text accompanying note 130.
136. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The requirement that an applicant satisfy the definition of
'child" is not the only statutory requirement. The Act also requires the child to be dependent
upon the wage earner at the time of death. The latter requirement would seem to preclude
benefits not only for an ART child who was conceived posthumously but also for a child who was
in gestation at the time of the wage earner's death. In the following passage, the Court basically
read this requirement out of the Act: "It was nonetheless Congress' prerogative to legislate for
the generality of cases. It did so here by employing eligibility to inherit under state intestacy law
as a workable substitute for burdensome case-by-case determinations whether the child was, in
fact, dependent on her father's earnings." Id. at 2032.
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UPC now addresses the matter.137 Had Robert Capato died domiciled
in a state that had enacted the UPC, his posthumously conceived
children would have inherited, 138 and that would have entitled them
to Social Security benefits. Unfortunately, he died domiciled in
Florida, where, in order to inherit, the twins must have been
conceived before his death. 139 The Court also foreclosed the idea of
providing uniformity among the states by developing federal common
law on the question: "We cannot [create] a uniform federal rule the
statute's text scarcely supports." 14 0
The result is that the posthumously conceived ART children of
one wage earner can qualify for survivor benefits, but the
posthumously conceived ART children of another wage earner cannot
receive those benefits.
As the reporter for the UPC provisions on ART children, I am
tempted to argue that the solution is for all states to enact the UPC,14 1
but I know that will not happen. I do urge more states to do so, not
only for purposes of Social Security survivor benefits but because of
the merits of the UPC quite apart from those benefits. 142
The actual solution rests with Congress. In 1939, when
Congress added the provisions granting survivor rights for children of
a deceased wage earner, the phenomenon of births by means of
assisted reproduction was unheard of, much less the idea of
posthumous conception. The first "test tube baby" was born in
England in 1978; the first in the United States in 1981.143 Now that
the Supreme Court has spoken so decisively, the results will continue
to vary from state to state until Congress holds hearings on the

137. See id. at 2032. For the UPC treatment, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-120, -121.
138. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (allowing posthumously conceived children to inherit
from their deceased parent so long as certain time requirements are met).
139. See FLA. STAT. § 732.106 (2014).
140. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2034.
141. A decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan, Mattison v. Social Security
Commissioner, 825 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. 2012), held that posthumously conceived ART children
born to the decedent's widow were not entitled to take by intestacy (and hence not entitled to
Social Security survivor benefits). That decision prompted the Council of the Probate and Estate
Planning Section of the State Bar of Michigan to appoint a committee to study enactment of the
UPC provisions dealing with ART children. Full disclosure: I am a member of that committee.
142. See Sheldon F. Kurtz & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Addresses the Class-Gift and

Intestacy Rights of Children of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 35 ACTEC L.J. 30, 30-33
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477961, archived at http://perma.cc/QD62-MQ3D.

143. See Walter Sullivan, First "Test Tube" Baby Born in U.S., Joining Success Around
World, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 1981) http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/
1228.html, archived at http://perma.cc/EUM9-46UN.
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question1 44 and brings the Social Security Act's survivor benefits
provisions up to date. 141
Sometimes state law is neither uniform nor well-enough
developed-and not likely to become so in the foreseeable future-to
govern rights to federal benefits. Such an instance is the right of
posthumously conceived ART children to survivor benefits under the
Social Security Act.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this survey of the creeping federalization of wealth-transfer
law, I found only one area in which the result has been benign. In all
the others, including the one area in which federal law has
incorporated state wealth-transfer law, the results have been
detrimental to the administration of justice. The responsibility lies
with all three branches of the federal government-legislative,
judicial, and executive.
First, the favorable result. The far-flung locations of our
military personnel-overseas, sometimes in combat zones, and on
stateside bases-have necessitated preemption of state will-execution
formalities. The federal military-wills statute does not stop at
expressly preempting state will-execution formalities, however. Unlike

144. Congressional hearings, if thorough, would take a hard look at how the UPC handles
the intestacy rights of ART children.
145. Federal authorities other than Congress are capable of a rapid response to new
developments. On October 28, 2014, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS")
announced that it had adopted a new policy granting citizenship to ART children born to female
U.S. citizens even if the children's mothers are not the children's genetic mothers. See Press
Alert, USCIS, USCIS Expands the Definition of "Mother" and "Parent" to Include Gestational
Mothers Using Assisted Reproductive
Technology (ART) (Oct. 28, 2014), http://
www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-expands-definition-mother-and-parent-include-gestational-mothersusing-assisted-reproductive-technology-art, archived at http://perma.cc/8P5M-8Q9W. The new
policy is implemented in USCIS's Policy Manual. See USCIS, POLICY MANUAL ch. 2E, http://
www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volume l2-PartH-Chapter2.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/QBG3-KQ99.
Although federal benefits for same-sex couples is a topic that is outside the scope of this
essay, federal authorities have been quick to respond to United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013), in which the Supreme Court held that the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which
denied federal benefits for same-sex married couples, is unconstitutional. Federal agencies and
courts have acted expeditiously to provide that same-sex married couples are entitled to federal
benefits even if they are domiciled in a state that does not recognize same-sex marriages. Lower
federal courts have gone further and held that state laws and constitutions defining marriage as
between one man and one woman violate the U.S. Constitution. The National Conference of
State Legislatures keeps up-to-date data on same-sex marriage laws and court decisions. See
Defining Marriage: State Defense of MarriageLaws and Same-Sex Marriage,NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriageoverview.aspx (last updated July 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/T7V3-DT5A.
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ERISA, FEGLIA, and the Treasury Regulations regarding U.S.
government securities in survivorship form, which simply preempt
state law without replacing it with any comparable federal
substitute, 146 the federal military-will statute responsibly replaces
preempted state will-execution formalities with a well-thought-out set
of federal will-execution formalities. The statute also requires the
execution of military wills to be supervised by a military legal
assistance counsel,14 7 greatly reducing the chance of defective
execution.
Apart from military wills, federal action with respect to state
wealth-transfer law has led to detrimental results. In the one instance
in which Congress has expressly tied federal benefits to state law, the
tie-in now works an injustice because the posthumously conceived
ART children of one wage earner can qualify for survivor benefits but
the posthumously conceived ART children of the another wage earner
are deprived of benefits. When Congress long ago expressly tied Social
Security survivor benefits to state intestacy law, the tie-in may have
made sense. But, because of advances in medical technology allowing
posthumous conception, the tie-in is now out of date. Congress needs
to bring the Social Security Act's out-of-date provisions regarding
survivor benefits for posthumously conceived ART children up to date
so that those federal benefits are uniform throughout the states
instead of being dependent on nonuniform state intestacy law in this
still-emerging field.
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Treasury Department
are responsible for undermining state wealth-transfer law reforms.
State law dealing broadly with questions of wealth transfers has
traditionally been backward and in many instances intent defeating.
The last few decades, however, have seen efforts largely spearheaded
by the ALI and the ULC to modernize that law. One of the efforts has
been to unify the law of probate and nonprobate transfers. The
Supreme Court's Egelhoff and Hillman decisions and the Treasury
regulations regarding U.S. government securities in survivorship form

146. Although Professor Meltzer notes that "it is unimaginable that [members of Congress
and congressional staffs] generally would be aware of the relevant array of state and local laws,"
Meltzer, supra note 21, at 15, state wealth-transfer laws are readily accessible in the
Restatements. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also Irish & Cohen, supra note 57,
at 111 ("Congress enacted ERISA while still oblivious to numerous problems related to benefit
plans that the states had already recognized and addressed.").
147. See supra note 102.
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have thoughtlessly and needlessly barred the unification effort for
federally authorized or regulated nonprobate transfers. 148
Congress has undermined state wealth-transfer law in the
perpetuity area by granting a tax exemption for perpetual trusts.
Unlike the well-thought-out federal statute relating to military wills,
the federal tax statute granted a tax exemption for perpetual trusts by
mistake, not by design. 149 That Congress has shown little inclination
to correct its earlier mistake is negligent at best and irresponsible at
worst.150 The result of its inattention is that wealth continues to
accumulate in perpetually tax-exempt trusts, now counted in the
billions of dollars. 151
Because of the raw power granted to the federal government by
the Constitution, federal law is the elephant in the room, even in a
traditional state-law sphere as wealth-transfer law. It is distressing
indeed that those who produce that elephant often-not always, but
often-seem oblivious to the damage they can do and have done to
well-considered state law. Whether the ULC's position paper urging
more care when dealing with state law1 52 will carry any weight with
federal authorities or will even be noticed by them remains to be seen.
It should, but I have doubts.
Shakespeare praised those who "have power to hurt, and will
do none." 153 Too bad that the concept of avoiding harm has not seeped
into the collective federal consciousness when intruding into a field so
traditionally the province of state law.

148. In some instances, the Justices' analysis has been embarrassingly uninformed. As
Professor Langbein noted: " [F]ederal courts are sometimes unaware of basic principles of the
wealth transfer field, as in Hillman, in which both the majority opinion and a concurrence by
Justice Alito voice the mistaken assumption that a life insurance beneficiary designation can be
altered by will." Langbein, supra note 6, at 1695.
149. See Waggoner, supranote 114, at 8-12.
150. Congress has known about the problem since at least 2005 and has had several
opportunities to correct its mistake. See id. at 2 n.3 ("It appears that the congressional taxwriting authorities were first officially notified of the problem in a 2005 report of the staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation."); see also id. at 9, 26-30. For a proposed solution, see id. at 30-33.
151. See id. at 3, 10 n.39 (recounting studies that indicate perpetually tax-exempt trusts
continue to grow, as they have "been tremendously profitable for banks and other financial
service companies, which can generate large fees administering these long term trusts").
152. See UNIF. LAW COMM'N, Principlesof Federalism, supra note 3, at 1.
153. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, SONNET XCIV, in SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS 100, 100 (Boston,

Ticknor & Fields 1865). Shakespeare's sonnets are readily accessible on the web, e.g.,
SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS http://www.shakespeares-sonnets.com/all.php (last visited Aug. 31,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3S2L-UDYB, and in many collected works, e.g., WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS (Stephen Booth ed. 2000).

